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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
R.OSS J. DAVIS and
.MARY DAVIS, his wife
Plaintiffs and Appella17ts,
vs.

t'

GLEN K. RILEY and MRS. GLEN
K. RILEY, his wife; LEON RILEY
a1H1 ~IRS. LEON RILEY, his wife;
and 1IRS. LOIS RILEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

~

\

Case
No.10827

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action, based on "Boundary by Acquiescence'', which adjudicated, by summary judgment, the
rights of the parties in and to a wedge-shaped strip of
land which extends generally East-West and is geographically situated in Bountiful, Davis County, between
the appellants' property on the North (hereinafter called
"the Davis property") and the respondents' property
on the South (hereinafter called "the Riley property").
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents' motion for summary judgment was
granted, and ordered following rehearing.
Thereafter, a period of thirty days was granted to
appellants to collect evidence to show an issue of fact.
No additional evidence was brought forward by the
appellants.
Judge Wahlquist in granting the summary judgment
stated:
''. . . defendants have substantial evidence
as follows, Number one, that they have held possession of the land in question for a period of
going back more than 26 years and that there is
no evidence or any assertion or any other type of
ownership in existence for that period. The
Court further believes that the construction of
the garage in the general pictures of the area is
such that they would imply a boundary line such
as the construction of the garage on lands is evidence of some claim of ownership at the time it
was done. The Court believes that the dead man
statute would preclude the conversation between
the two predecessors in interest to go back into
the thirties in this action. I believe that statute
to be moot in that it does not show any claim
by plaintiffs in this instance, any claim of thiR
land in use beyond the fence as here testified to.
The Court believes that the evidence of the
defendants as such in this case would have to he
accepted by a finder of fact unless refuted.
The Court further finds that there is no evidence to refute it.
The Court therefore grants the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.''
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents submit that the granted summary judgment is well found in law and fact. Therefore, the trial
court's decision should be affirm€'d.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tlw Hiley property (see defendants' Exhihit 1) was
arf]nired through vVarranty Deed from Daniel K. and
Priscilla Davis (grandparents of appellant Ross J.
D1n·is) h>· L€'onidas G. Rile>· (deceased husband of respo1Hlent Lois Riley aml father of respondents Glen and
Lron Ril0y) in ~rarch of 1920. (R-69 to 71, Ex. A)
Sinrt' 1020, the Riley family, consisting of husband.
L0nniclas CT. Rile>·, wife, respondent Lois Riley, and sons,
rr>spoll(]P11t Glen and Leon Riley, has owned in one mannrr or another, and has had exclusiYe possession, exclusive control. exclusin• use and exclnsi,·e cnstod~· of the
lm1c1 consisting- d (a) the Riley property, and (b) the
nwntione<1 wrdze-shaped strip of l:rnd in disnute. 'rh0
~trip of land is the portion cross hate heel in defendants'
Exhibit 1 and extends up to a visibl~, marked line running along the North edge of the strip of land. Leonidas
G. Rik»·. who died in 1964, was the sole owner of the
Riley property for 36 years. In 1956 the real property
was placed under the joint ownership of Leonidas G.
Rile~· and his wife, respondent Lois B. Riley. (Deposition of Lois Riley, Ex. 1)
Since 1920 the Davis famil>·, consisting of grandfather. Daniel K. Da,·is, father, Daniel Murra>· Davis,
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and son, appellant Ross J. Davis, has owned, i11 one manner or another, and has had only exclusive possession
and control and use of the Davis property up to, hut
not beyond, the North edge of the strip of land. ( Deposition of Daniel Murray Davis, page 4; R-37, Ex. A)
Thus, it is undisputed that the Rileys and Davises
had been adjoining landowners for 46 years at the time
this litigation was instituted.
A fence, extending generally East-\Vest along the
North edge of the mentioned wedge-shaped strip of land,
existed when the Riley property was acquired by Leonidas G. Riley in 1920. ( Deposition of Danie 1 ~I urray
Davis, page 8, lines 4-6) The fence constisted of permanently anchored wood posts and barbed wire. (Deposition of Leon Riley, page 4, lines 14-26; Dcpositio!l or'
Glen Riley, page 6, line 28 to page 7, line 9; Deposition
of Lois Riley, page 21, lines 17-24)
The fence and its geographical relation to the dri\"t'way is clearly illustrated in the photographs attached to
pages 3, 12, 19 and 29 of defendants' Exhibit 6, R--!2.
Four posts of the original fence remain standing (DPfendants' Exhibits 1, 3, 5 and 7, R-42)
The fence demarked the North edge of a drinway,
constructed by Leonidas G. Riley in about 1924 when he
also erected a garage. (Appellants' Brief, page 4, lines
2-3; R-70, paragraph 7; T-7, 8) The garage, about onehalf of which rests on the strip of land in question (Defendants' Ex. 1, Ex. 3), still remains in its original 1924
4

location. (Defendants' Ex. 6, page 10, R-42; Deposition
nf Loi,-, Ril0y, page 20, lines 10-12; T-16) The magnitude
of encroachment of the garage upon the strip of land in
question is shown graphically on defendants' Exhibit 1
mid pietorially on defendants' Exhibits 4 and 5, R-42.
Thr South edge of the strip of land in question runs approximatel~, up the middle of the clrh'eway ( a11out fonr
fret from the North Nlge of th0 house) along a line extrrn1ing lietween the two grouncl positions identified hy
the do"·nwarcl end of the staff held b~T the person in the
photographs, (1efendant,q' Exhibit 4, which was taken faci1w: East, and defendants' Exhibit 5, which was taken
faeing \Y 0st. Observe that the space between the identifi0!l South edge of the strip of land and the North edge
of the Riley house is so small as not to be capable of
per sr sening as a driveway. (Also see Deposition of
Olrn Ril0y, page 9, lines 2-6)
The driveway now also remains in its original 1924
position (compare photograph, defendants' Exhibit 4,
with the lo>Yest photograph on page 29 of defendants'
FJxhihit 6, R-42), ha'.'ing been replenished with gravel
from time to time. Though unsuccessful attempts were
made to acquire additional land North of the strip of
lnnd in question (T-9, 10, 13; Deposition of Daniel Murray Davis, page 10, line 28 to page 11, line 3) to widen
the Riley drinway to accommodate truck traffic, the
width of the drivewa~' remains today the same as it was
in 1024 when constructed. (Defendants' Exs. 4 and 6,
pagr 29, R-42; Deposition of Glen Riley, page 8, lines
8-14; Deposition of Lois Rile~T' page 16, lines 18-27 and
pt:ge 23, lines 23-29; T-8)
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The land upon which the garage and driveway rest
and the small remaining land portion which comprise the
strip of land in question has remained under the exclusi,,e care, custody, occupancy, possession and control of
the Riley family since the early 1920 's. (Deposition of
Lois Riley, page 24, lines 10-21; T-11, 12, 17, rn, 22)

It should be remembered that at the point in time
when Leonidas G. Riley constructed the drive,rny and
garage just North of the Riley house, the Riley property
consisted on the order of about 300 front feet situated
along First East in Bountiful, Utah, almost all of thr·
front feet being South of the Riley house. (Depositio11
of Lois Riley, page 26, line 3; R-69, 70) It is inconceiYable that a person owning that much frontage would
intentionally locate a garage and driveway on property
belonging to another.
There is no evidence of any member of the Da\'is
family raising any objection whatsoever to the erection
of the garage and the construction of the driveway leacling from the street to the garage. In fact the garage waR
placed by Leonidas G. Riley" ... so that water draining
from the garage roof would clearly drip from the eaws
of the garage upon the Riley property .... " (R-70)
Additional monuments consisting of permanent Yisible markings have been placed by Leonidas G. Riley
along the mentioned fence line from time to time over
the years. As can be appreciated by reference to defendants' Exhibit 4 and defendants' Exhibit 6, page 29,
lower photo, R-42, the mentioned driveway has always

6

<1c·<·npiPd tlw approximatr 8 or 9 foct ''"irlth which exists
lid1Yern thr Riley house and the mentionPd fence' line.
Specifically, in al1ont J!"r~+. Leonidas G. Riley awl
l1is wifr, respornlent Lois Riley, plantecl a numher of
.---;iacecl ee<lar tre<':; arnl onr 1Yalm1t trer dirPrtl:· '11nug the
f1•11rc> linr. ('r-6, 7, lG, 17) 'rh<>s<> reclar trP<>s m1cl their
f1•11c<' line' clispositi011 are shown clearly in the photoc:rnphs attached to pa~es 6, 8, !l, 12.
:rnts' Fixhihit 6, R-42.

rn

and 20 of defend-

Later, in about 1951, because the cedar trees were
scratching automobiles tra,·ersing the dri,·e"·ay (T-6),

all hnt onr of the cedar trees was remo\·ecl and replaced
l1v a (•oncr<>tr retaining wall, also situated c1irectl:·
along the mentioned fence line. (Deposition of Leon
Rile:·, pag-e 3, lines 2:i-30: Deposition of Glen Riley,
page 0, lines 11-18: Deposition of Lois Riley, page 18.
liPJIS H-Hl, page 21, lines 2::l-26: T-6) rrhe one remaining
errlar tree, shown at the left in the photog-raph identifircl as defendants' Exhihit :1, R-42, is also shown as it
a )'1Jea r<>rl shortl:· after ini tia 1 planting in the top photo~rn ph

attached

to paQ,"e 10 of defendants' ExhiHt G. Thc>

trnnk of the one remaining cedar tree (shown at the left
in the photograph identified as defendants' Exhibit 3:
R-42) and the trunk of the remaining walnut tree are
<lisposecl approximately in line with the retaining wall.
The retaining wall is clearly illustrated as being in direct
liJl(•ar alignment ·with the four remaining fence posts on
Great Basin Mapping and Snrny Company map, entit1Pd "prepared for Ross J. DaYis' ', and found follo\Ying R-45.
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The concrete retaining ·wall, which was installed lJy
Leonidas G. Riley along with the assistance of his two
sons, respondents Glen K. and Leon Riley (DPpositio 11
of Gleu Riley, page 5, lines 22-23, page 8, lines 15-19;
Deposition of Leon Riley, page 4, lines 27-29), is shown
in the photographs identified as defendants' Exhibit~
2 and 4, R-42.
The Riley family has from time to time planted
flo\vers and the like upon the strip of land in question
as can be appreciated by reference to defendants' Exhibit 3, R-42, showing Iris adjacent the one remaining
cedar tree at the left of the photograph. (Deposition of
Lois Riley, page 24, line 29)
No land or boundary survey was e\·er conclndecl hy
any member of the Davis or the Riley families during
the 46-year period from 1920 to 1966 (Deposition of
Daniel Murray Davis, page 14, line 24 to page 15, line 2:
Deposition of Glen Riley, page 8, lines 20-26; Deposition
of Lois Riley, page 22, lines 20-23), even though the
Riley and Davis families were adjoining landowners during the entire mentioned 46-year period. No suney hy
either family preceded or accompanied the erection of
the Riley garage and the construction of the dri\'e\\·<1:·
leading to the garage on the strip of land. No sun-ey lJy
either party preceded or accompanied the placement of
the cedar trees along the fence line. No sun-ey hy eitllC'r
party preceded or accompanied the construction of the
retaining v.all along the fence line.
Beyond a doubt, the location of such monument:;,
physically dividing property exclusinly possessed anil
8

used hy one neigh hor (the Rileys) from that exrlusively
possessed and used hy another neighbor (the Davises)
had to inherently be fraught with 11ncertainty in relation
to where the boundary between the properties described
in (keels of record might actually prove to be.
The acquiescence to and continuous honoring of such
;Ill uncertain ph~vsical dividing line between properties
for four and one-half decades is undisputed.
Certainly, actions by the parties and their predessors in interest over four and one-half decades speak
louder than words uttered the year following. At no
time between 1920 and the present dispute, which came
into being in 1966, has the Davis family ever challenged
the Riley family's rights to the strip of land in question.
During the four and one-half decades, no member of the
Da,'is family has ever complained of or guarded against
eneroachment by the Riley family upon the strip of land
in question. During the four and one-half decades, the
Da,·is family has had no custody, possession, use, or control of the strip of land in question and has nen•r insist0cl on such. All acts of both the Davis family ancl the
Riley family have recognized the visibly marked fence
line as the physical dividing line between their respectin
properties.
Daniel Murray Davis, father of appellant Ross .J.
Da,·is, C'OllC'edecl that the fence line was disposed "hetween" the Riley and Ross Davis properties (Deposition
of Daniel J\forray Davis, page 7, lines 8-18), thus recognizing the fence line as physically cfo·idi11g the Riley
9

property from tlw Davis property and including the
strip of land in question as part of the Ril0y property.
Appellant, Ross J. Davis, honored th0 fence line as
the physical houndan·-in-fact lwhye0n th0 Dm·is a11d
Riley properti0s as recentl~· as earl:· 1966 (T-22), only
a few weeks before discovering through surv0~· that tlir·
described property line was not coincident \Yi th t lw f enc(•
line. (T-19 to 22)
E,·en though 36 days expired betwe011 the hearin!!
(Nm·emher 29, 1966) and re-hearing (,January 4, 1967)
on motion for summary judgment, and enn though t ]ip
Court on Januan· 4, 1967 (T-26), granted appellants 30
days for submitting new e,·idence suggestive of an issnP
of fact, no competent and admissible evidence was introduced which would possibly indicate permissin use by
the Riley family of the strip of lanfl in question for tlir·
mentioned four and one-half decades. Ahnndant, competent testimony is present in the record that the exclusive possession, control, custody and use of the strip of
land in question by the Rily family was because the:· considered the land as Riley property (Deposition of Lois
Rile~·, page 14, lines 24-28; page 15, line 26; pag<' 18,
lines 17-22; page 22, lines 15-19) and did not permissively use and occupy the strip of land. (Deposition of
Lois Riley, Supra, and page 16, line 24-27; page 27,
lines 12-22; T-11, 12, 17, 19; Deposition of Leon Riley,
pag0 3, lines 7-10, page 6, lines 19-22: Deposition of Glen
Riley, page 9, lines 11-20) Daniel :Murray Davis's
attempt to testify that land North of the fence line, and
accordingly North of the land in question ( T-9, 10; Depo-
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sit ion of Daniel :i\I urray Davis, page 10, line 27 to page
11, line 20), was used permissively by the Riley family
was correctly excluded by the Trial Court as obviously
heing contrary to dead man's statute, 78-24-2(3), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. (T-23)
Council for appellants was not surprised by this
exclusion, as he was apprised of the objection on .July 22,
1966 (Deposition of Lois Riley, page 16, line 30), over
four months before the November 29, 1966, hearing on
motion for summary judgment.

A verified but hearsay statement by Kelly S. Davis,
brother of appellant Ross J. Davis, in the same regard,
did not ''present a sufficiently strong position to justify
reopening the question once submitted". (T-26)
ARGUMENT
The law presented by respondents and relied on by
the Trial Court at the hearing and re-hearing on the
motion for summary judgment, made by both appellants
and respondent with full consent by both counsels, eomprised two cases, namely King v. Fronk, 14 U.2d 135,
~78 P.2d 893 (Utah 1963) and Fuoco v. Williams, 15 U.2d
L'56, :398 P.2d 143 (Utah 1964). (T-15; R-59) These cases
set forth the controlling law as related to the subject
matter of the present controversy, the principle issue
of which is whether or not respondents now own the strip
of land inquestion by reason of the doctrine of '' boundary by acquiescence".
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It is surprising that si11ce .T11c1g0 \Vahlqnist 's rnling
was hased on the Frn11k and 1Villiam.c: opi11ions (R-:J~).
that appellants make no mention of these ro11trolli11g
cases. It would seem that the weakness of appella11t:o::'
case is initiall>- e\-ic1ent hy th0 H'l'>- failun• to rite ani]
apply tlw current "houndar>- hy acqniesrence'' law, a~
set forth in Fronk and Williams.

Briefly, the Williams opinion unequi\·orall>· summarir,es the respediYe burdens of the parties facing a honndary by acquiescence issue. The burden of the pa rt;:
claiming land by "acquiescence" IS rlearly d01ineatr<1
hy the fol1owing language:
"These elements are: (1) occupation up to
a visible line marked definitely by monument~.
fences or huildings, and (2) acquiescence in the
line as a boundary (3) for a long period of ye::m
( 4) by adjoining landowners.''
If he who seeks land under the doctrine of honrnlary
by acquiescence is able to hear the mentioned four-point
burden.
" ... the presumption that a binding agreement exists settling a dispute or uncertain hotmdary ... "

comes into being.
Such a presumption, once established, can he oYerturned only if he who assails the title by acquiescrnrc
IS able to
"
show by competent evidence that a
houndary was not thus established."
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With the above-mentioned law in mind, the trial
court did not pass judgment on the issue of whether or
not land had passed by "acquiescence" simply by accepting currently-professed, heretofore-undisclosed hincl·"ight-intent of the parties. The trial court properly determ in eel the acquiescence issue based on the foregoing
la,,- as measured through the continuous acts and conduct
liy both the Riley and Davis families, all of whom consistently honored and recognized the fence line as the
physical division between the Riley and Davis properties
for four and one-half decades.
Specifically, it is undisputed that the Riley and
Davis families had been adjoining landO"wners for 46
years prior to the present clispute.
The fence line, originally marked by permanently
ai1ehored 'mod posts and barhecl ·wire spanning between
the postf; has at all times been treated by the Riley and
Davis families as the physical dividing line between the
DaYis pro1wrty and the Riley property. Daniel ~Iurray
Da,·is a('knowleclged the fence line as the physical division hetween the Davis and Riley properties. (Deposition
of Daniel ~Iurray Davis, page 7, lines 17 and 18), and he
acknowledged that the driveway was the unchallenged
possession of Leonidas G. Riley. (Deposition of Daniel
.\Iurray Da,·is, page 10, line 28 to page 11, line 3). He
confirms that the cedar trees planted by Leonidas G.
Riley were " ... between the fence posts .... " (Deposition of Daniel Murray Davis, page 11, lines 18-20) Daniel
.\Iurray Da ,·is never challenged the Rileys' exclusin
rig-ht to the property as he stated he '' . . . nenr dit1
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have ... '' any kind of a dispute concerning the boundaries between the properties. (Deposition of Daniel
Murray Davis, page 12, lines 28-30) Mr. Daniel Murra:·
Davis thought that th<' concrete retaining wall wa~
'' ... six or seven feet ... '' X orth of the original fenc·(·
line (Deposition of Daniel Murray Davis, page 13, lines
2J-2B and page 16, line ), hut this is incorrect. Compare
the two photographs consisting of defendants' F,xhihib
4 and 6, page 29, lowest photograph, R-42. Daniel ~[m_
ra:r Dads and other members of the Da,'is family wrrr·
willing to accept, until now, the uncertaint>· in honmlar:>
which comes by placing monuments to physically cfo-id\·
properties without the benefit of a competent land snrVf'~V. Before 1966, such sun·ey was ne,·er requestC'r1 lnthe Davises. (Deposition of Daniel "'.\Iurray Drn·is, pn!.!:1·
14, line 24 to page 13, lin<> 2)
Significantly, four of the original fence posts still
remain in virtually the same position occupied whf'll the·
Riley property was purchased by Leonidas G. Rile:· in
1920. (Defendants' Exs. 3, 5 and 7, R-42)
Appellant, Ross .J. Davis, in early 1966, before cfocovering by survey the whereabouts of the described
boundary, recognized the fenceline by planting three pine
trees just inches North of f enceline. (Defendants' Ex. 7.
R-42; T-19 to 22) Ross ,J. Davis later in Court acknowl<:>do-ed that the sun·eyed
. line was about four f<:>et South
of where he had planted the three pine trees (T-21) just
we<:>ks before. Thus, Ross J. Davis treated the fencelinc
as the ph:·sical dividing line between the Riley and DnYi'
~

properties.
14

Leonidas G. Riley continually placed additional permanent monuments of different types up to and directly
along the mentioned fenceline. These monuments include
a garage (erected in 1924), the North wall of which is
ahout two feet South of the fenceline (Deposition of
Leon Riley, page 5, lines 26-29; R-60, 61) and which encroaches by about 50% of its width upon the strip of
land; a gravel driveway installed up to the fence line,
also about 1924; a number of cedar trees placed in lineal
relation directly along the fenceline in about 1934; and
a concrete retaining wall, installed in about 1951, directly
along the fenceline and spanning almost the entire length
of the driveway .

. :\ t no time preceding or accompanying the placement of the mentioned permanent and visible markings
along the f enceline were land boundary surveys conducted hy any member of the Riley or Davis families.
(Deposition of Daniel Murray Davis, page 14, line 24
to page 15, line 2; Deposition of Lois Riley, page 22,
lines 20-23) Accordingly, the whereabouts of the legally
described line between the properties would obviously
and necessarily be uncertain as related to the fenceline.
This uncertainty persisted from the time Mr. Leonidas
G. Rile~· purchased the Riley property in 1920 until 1966,
when for the first time a boundary survey was mdulged in.

By reason of the foregoing, set forth in deposition,
afficlaYit and testimony taken during the hearing of the
motion for summary judgment, the four elements require>d to raise the presumption that a binding boundary
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hy acqui<>sce!lC'f' agTec'mC'Ilt t>xistPd to scttlf' a tlispntP 11r
mice rt a in hon nda ry \Ye re proved h!· com pet C>nt e\·ident·i·
heforp the trial court. The clear proof of ( 1) OC'cnpan(':>
up to a line ,·isihly marked h:· monuments, de. (~) ;l(•_
qnif'S('f'lll'P in thf' line as a hon11dar~- (:n for a long pPriod
of ~·ears ( J) hy adjoining la11downC>rs C'omprised null
does now comprisP a prima faciP "honndar:· h:· acq11il·'·
c0nce" C'as0 in fanlr of the respornlent:-;. In thi:-; n•g;ml .
.J ndge -Wahlquist said :
''The Court believes that the evidence of thr
defendants as such in this case \rnuld have to he
aceepted hy a finder of fact unless refuted.
The Court further finds that there is no eyj.
dence to refute it." (T-23)
Tlw appellants were thereafter unable to show lff
"eompetent evidenee" that a houndan· was not thns
established, en•n though a pNiod in t>xcess of two month'
was a\·ailable to the appellants to aC'quire such e\·idenrr
and pres0nt it to the court. Obviously, snch compdeut
e\·idence apparently dOPs not 0xist.
The incompetent aml belated 0\·id0nce, lwlated h:1
four and one-half decades, which Daniel Murray D~n-i'
desired to present conc0rni11g the alleged granting 0!
oral permissive use of land North of the fenceline is in
eonflict with -:\Tr. Da,·is 's other testimony and inconsistPnt with the fads as 110 larnl }forth of the fencelim·
was ei·er USP(l h:· tl1(' Rileys. Tlw testimony concerniM
oral permissi\·e us0 of snC'h larnl "'.'\ orth of the fe11celi11v
,,·as corr0dly exclncled nrnler the dea<l man's statnte h:thr trial jmlge. (T-~::l) Th0 0\·ide11ce of appellant Ros'
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.J. Davis's brother, Kelly, clearly based on hearsay
( R--Hl), did not justify vacating the summary judgment
l!'J°:lll t ed in fa rnr of the respondents hy trial .Judge ·wahlqnist. ('r-26)

CONCLUSION
Th(• JH't•sent ease is <lire('tly related to the situation

,,J1icl1 <1rose i11 Ki11q Y. Fronk. The following opinion of
ilw t·omt in F'ro11k is as applicable in the present situa1 io11 ;1s it was to the case decided, namely:
'' ... the passage of a long time, accompanied
b.v an ancient Yisible linc>, marked by monuments
with other pertinent and particular facts, and
\vith a do-nothing history on the part of the parties concerned, can result in putting to rest titles
to property and prevent protracted and often
belligerent litigation usually attended by dusty
memory, departure of witnesses, unavailability
of trustworthy testimony, irritation with neighbors, and the like. This idea is based on the concept that ''e must live together in the spirit just if~·ing rc>pose and fixation of titles where there
has been a disposition on the part of neighbors
to leav(' an ancient bournlary as is 11:itlrnut taking
some affirmative action to assert rights inconsisf('nt 1cith eridence of a visiblP, long-st(]/Y/ding
boundary. In the vernacular, the doctrine might
b(' paraphrased to enunciate boundaries might be
('Stablishf'd hy an 'I don't give a hoot' attitudf'
on thc> part of neigh hors." (emphasis added)
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The respondents have clearly established at the trial
court a prima facie ''boundary by acquiescence'' case
not refuted by competent testimony. It is respectfully
submitted, therefore, that respondents are entitled to
have he trial court's summary judgment in their faYor
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LYNN G. FOSTER
6759 South 2445 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents
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